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A Millstone Around the Neck? Stereotypes about Wives and Myths about Divorce 
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This article examines the effect of and connection between stereotypes about wives and myths 
about financial provision on divorce. It is based on an assessment of press reports on Mill  v 
Mills which have fuelled calls for reform of the law of financial provision on divorce, most 
notably the Divorce (Financial Provision) Bill 2017-2019. It argues that gendered stereotypes 
about wives (such as ‘alimony drone’, ‘gold-digger’ and ‘meal ticket for life’) inhibit shifts 
towards substantive equality for women. These gendered stereotypes have not only framed the 
debate, creating a non-existent problem for reform proposals to solve, but have also affected 
the way in which individuals form family law agreements, which is important given the current 
policy emphasis on private ordering.  The article concludes by proposing that reflexive 





                                                          
1 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Universities of Durham, W rwick, Bristol and NUI Galway 
between 2017-2018. I would like to thank the attendees at these talks for their valuable comments, and to Dr 
Andy Hayward, Dr Illan Wall, Dr Katie Cruz and Dr John Danaher for inviting me to present this research on 
these occasions. I am also indebted to Professor Russell Sandberg for his detailed feedback on this article and I 




In 1983, Juanita Frances (founder and then President of the Married Women’s Association2) 
wrote: ‘It is said the media’s campaign is a backlash against the modicum of equality women 
have so far achieved’.3 She was referring to the ‘Justice in Divorce’ campaign in the 1980s that 
contributed to the introduction of the ‘clean break’ principle,4 which facilitated the ending of 
financial ties between divorcing spouses (and in particular the payment of spousal support).5 
This ‘Justice in Divorce’ campaign was not about the severe impact separation could have on 
wives; it was about the alleged injustice of divorce for men.6 The ‘lively’7 campaign received 
extensive media coverage, and Frances was right to be concerned about the consequences of 
this when she said: 
 
The controversy has vilified women and branded them with a ‘meal ticket for life’ syndrome. 
Accusations in the press have made them out as ‘alimony drones’, and the public has responded 
with concern that there could not be smoke without fire. Both men and women have jumped 
into the fray, showing bias and prejudice against the true state of the economically depressed 
position of women and children in divorce.8 
 
                                                          
2 The Married Women’s Association was formed in 1938 and disbanded in 1988. It campaigned for marriage to 
be recognised as an equal financial partnership in law: Sharon Thompson, ‘Married Women’s Property Act 
1964’ in Erika Rackley and Rosemary Auchmuty (eds.) Women’s Legal Landmarks (Hart 2018) chapter 36. 
3 Letter from Juanita Frances (25 January 1983), London School of Economics, The Women’s Library, Records 
of the Married Women’s Association, 5MWA/5. 
4 Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984, amending the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. 
5 Gillian Douglas, Obligation and Commitment in Family Law (Hart 2018) 120. 
6 Stephen Cretney, Family Law in the Twentieth Century: A History (OUP 2003) 139. 
7 Douglas (n 5) 121. 
8 Frances (n 3). 
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Frances incisively captures the harm caused by stereotypes about women on divorce. The 
media’s portrayal of wives as unfairly leeching from their ex-husbands in the 1980s9 influenced 
public opinion and undermined the spirit of the Matrimonial Property and Proceedings Act 
1970, which recognised the property entitlements of spouses as a result of their unpaid work in 
the home. Gillian Douglas notes that the many complaints bout wives receiving ‘meal tickets 
for life’ came from ‘disgruntled husbands and their second wives’ and that the Law 
Commission focused on their hardship.10 However, contemporary research findings suggested 
that the amount of maintenance transferred to former wives was significantly lower than media 
reports suggested.11 
It is disappointing, yet predictable, given the formal equality and neo-liberal influences 
discussed later in this article, that more than 35 years later, media coverage of Baroness 
Deech’s Divorce (Financial Provision) Bill 2017-2019 make Frances’ words resonate loudly. 
Once again, there is a media backlash against the move towards equality as articulated in 2000 
by the House of Lords in White v White.12 The power of this backlash is perpetuated by 
Baroness Deech who has argued her reform is urgent because: 
 
                                                          
9 See Andrew Gilbert, British Conservatism and the Legal Regulation of Intimate Relationships (Hart 2018), 
chapter 3. 
10 Douglas (n 5) 121. Law Commission, The Financial Consequences of Divorce: The Basic Policy, A 
Discussion Paper (Law Com No 103, 1980). For a contemporary summary of the impact of the clean break 
principle’s introduction in 1984, see Pamela Symes, ‘Indissolubility and the clean break’ (1985) 48(1) Modern 
Law Review 44. 
11 As Miles and Hitchings have pointed out, while advocates of reform complained of former wives unfairly and 
parasitically exhausting their ex-husband’s resources, Maclean and Eeklaar’s research showed that ‘the amounts 
of maintenance transferred were very low, and constituted a much lower percentage of payors’ household 
income than of recipients’: Joanna Miles and Emma Hitchings, ‘Financial remedy outcomes on divorce in 
England and Wales: Not a 'meal ticket for life'’ (2018) 31(2) Australian Journal of Family Law 43-80, citing 
John Eekelaar and Mavis Maclean, Maintenance after Divorce (Clarendon Press 1986). 
12 [2000] UKHL 54. 
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The wife who is least likely ever to have put her hand in cold water during the marriage is the 
one most likely to walk off with millions, regardless of her contributions or conduct. Hence we 
find that London is the divorce capital of the world for the wealthy, and the phrases “gold 
digger” or “alimony drone” have been coined.13 
 
Drawing on my earlier research on the historical context of the gold-digger,14 this article 
will take a closer look at this media backlash. For the first time, this article explores the use of 
stereotypes about wives in press reports concerning a judicial decision and how these 
stereotypes have fuelled calls for reform. In part one, the most prevalent stereotypes about 
wives in the media are introduced and contextualised. Following this, part two takes a closer 
look at how such stereotypes are utilised. It will do this by studying six national press reports 
published online over the course of one week15 following the Court of Appeal decision in the 
financial remedies case Mills v Mills.16 These press reports are evaluated to ascertain how 
stereotypes about wives are communicated to readers, and so the focus is on coverage of Mills 
rather than an analysis of the case itself. Though Mills has now been decided in the Supreme 
Court,17 the Court of Appeal coverage is studied instead to assess initial reporting of the facts 
of the case.18 
                                                          
13 HL Deb 27 June 2014, vol 754, col 1491. 
14 Sharon Thompson, ‘In defence of the gold-digger’ (2016) 6(6) Oñati Socio-Legal Series 1225-1248. 
15 6- 12 February 2017. 
16 [2017] EWCA Civ 129. 
17Mills v Mills [2018] UKSC 38. 
18 Much of the reporting on the appeal to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court decision repeats the 
information published in the initial reporting of the case. 
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Press coverage of financial provision on divorce arguably plays an important role in 
shaping public perceptions,19 and so in part three, the effect of stereotypes prevalent in the press 
reports from part two is further explored. It will be argued that the unsubstantiated fear of terms 
like ‘alimony drone’, ‘gold-digger’ and ‘meal ticket for life’20have led to continued calls for 
sweeping reform (including binding prenuptial agreements)21 and claims that England and 
Wales are undesirable places for wealthy men to get divorced.22 
In addition to highlighting the ramifications of stereotypes about women and the 
subsequent myths promulgated on divorce, along with their practical and damaging impacts, 
this article also confronts the question of what can be done to counter them in part four. The 
aim of this analysis is not only to expose the empirical evidence undermining claims of gold-
digging in financial provision cases. Rather, it is to follow the work of Rosemary Hunter, 
Angela Melville23and others,24 who have sought to challenge family law ‘post-truths’. As a 
result, this article contends that negative stereotypes about women are dominant because those 
                                                          
19 This is also argued in the context of the criminalisation of paid homecare workers in Lydia Hayes, ‘Sex, class 
and CCTV: The covert surveillance of paid homecare workers’ in Lisa Adkins and Maryanne Dever (eds) The 
Post-Fordist Sexual Contract. Working and Living in Contingency (Palgrave 2015) 171, 183. 
20In particular, see Miles and Hitchings (n 11), which outlines findings from a range of data sets showing that 
the meal ticket for life concern is unfounded. 
21 Divorce (Financial Provision) Bill 2017-2019; Frances Gibb, ‘Family Matters: Urgent call for new divorce 
laws as judges demand overhaul of ‘corrosive’ system’  The Times (London, 19 November 2017) 
<https://www.thetimes.co.uk/edition/news/urgent-call-for-new-divorce-laws- s-judges-demand-overhaul-of
corrosive-system-8k0ncg7gt> accessed 3 June 2018. 
22 See, for instance the second reading debate of the Divorce (Financial Provsion) Bill 2017-2019, where 
Baroness Deech reiterating the now commonly used phrase that London is the ‘divorce capital of the world’: HL 
Deb 11 May 2018, vol 791, col 376. 
23 Rosemary Hunter and Angela Melville, 'As everybody knows': Countering myths of gender bias in family law’ 
(2001) 10(1) Griffith Law Review 124.  
24 Maebh Harding and Annika Newnham, ‘Initial research findings : the typical levels of parental involvement 
where post-separation parenting is resolved by court order' (2014) 44(5) Family Law; Julie Doughty, Lucy Reed 
and Paul Magrath, Transparency in the Family Courts: Publicity and Privacy in Practice (Bloomsbury 2018); 
Miles and Hitchings (n 11). 
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who talk about tropes such as gold-digging believe incorrectly that it is a widespread social 
problem. These perceptions are increasingly effective in family law, as the withdrawal of legal 
aid25 means couples increasingly must reach their own financial settlements on divorce.26When 
these settlements depend on parties’ respective negotiating strengths, the non-moneyed 
spouse’s bargaining position is weakened by the perception that she will be an undeserving 
gold-digger or parasitic alimony drone if she asks for more money than her spouse is willing 
to part with. If the influence of stereotypes about wives is therefore not fully recognised, our 
understanding of the context in which settlements are reached on divorce is incomplete. It is 
imperative that the effect of gendered stereotypes on these settlements is recognised, because 
as contract theorists like Eric Posner assert, the reality in which parties make agreements is 
complex and ‘powerful social norms may play a greater role in regulating contracts than the 
law does’.27Crucially, inaccurate stereotypes are harmful as they mis-frame and diminish the 
real issues of economic disadvantage on divorce experienced by those with caring 
responsibilities. Reflexivity is therefore essential in judicial reasoning, to acknowledge this 
broader context and to tackle tropes head on in judgment making.  
 
Part 1: Stereotypes about Wives 
‘Alimony drone’ and ‘gold-digger’ are gendered phrases in that they are applied almost 
exclusively to women. Even the definitions of ‘gold-digger’ and ‘alimony drone’ in the Oxford 
English Dictionary (OED) refer explicitly to women and not men.28 The OED defines ‘alimony 
                                                          
25 Pursuant to the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. 
26 See Emma Hitchings, ‘Official, operative and outsider justice: the ties that (may not) bind in family financial 
disputes’ (2017) 29(4) Child and Family Law Quarterly 359.  
27 Eric Posner, ‘A Theory of Contract Under Conditions of Radical Judicial Error’ (2000) 94 Northwestern 
University Law Review 749. 
28 The term ‘fortune hunter’ has historically been applied to men, but the dictionary definition is gender neutral: 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/fortune_hunter. This is interesting given that nineteenth century 
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drone’ as: ‘A woman who lives on alimony payments and makes no attempt to support 
herself’.29 Similarly, ‘gold-digger’ is defined in the OED as: ‘A woman who forms 
relationships with men purely to obtain money or gifts from them’.30These definitions tell us 
that first, women to whom these labels are attached are either deliberately economically 
dependent or are concerned solely with material gain, and secondly, that men are not alimony 
drones or gold-diggers. As a result, when these terms are employed in the media, they are used 
to vilify women, not men. Ultimately, and as the following analysis illustrates, these terms lead 
to women’s intentions being questioned when entering relationships like marriage and when 
negotiating financial settlements on divorce. Even worse, the phrases ‘gold-digger’ and 
‘alimony drone’ can be used arbitrarily regardless of women’s intentions when marrying or 
divorcing. This is evidenced in Terry Arendell’s research on the enactment of gender in 
interviews with divorced men. She found that ‘most … interviewees believed, and insisted 
repeatedly, that women unjustly “soak” or “bleed” men dry economically on divorce’.31 
 This is also inextricably linked to the common perception that women are routinely 
granted a ‘meal ticket for life’ by the court on divorce. The ‘meal ticket’ phrase is generally 
associated with ‘joint lives’ orders, whereby spousal maintenance lasts indefinitely until the 
court orders otherwise, the recipient re-partners32 or one of the parties dies.33 Quantitative and 
                                                          
literature frequently casts the fortune hunter as a man seeking to marry a woman of wealthy status (see, for 
example Mr Wickham in Jane Austen, Pride and Prejudice (T. Egerton 1813)) when ‘gold-diggers’ in literature 
are almost (if not) always women (see, for example Holly Golightly in Truman Capote, Breakfast at Tiffany’s 
(The Folio Society 2013) a character often labelled as being a gold-digger). While the term ‘gold-digger’ 
continues to be part of our vernacular, ‘fortune hunter’ is not. 
29 Oxford English Dictionary: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/alimony_drone. 
30 Oxford English Dictionary: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/gold-digger. 
31 Terry Arendell, ‘Reflections on the Researcher-Researched Relationship: A Woman Interviewing Men’ 
(1997) 20(3) Qualitative Sociology 341. 
32 The maintenance will commonly terminate following long-term cohabitation and will always terminate upon 
remarriage. 
33 See section 28(1) Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. 
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qualitative research34 by Joanna Miles and Emma Hitchings shows that such orders are rare, 
and that more broadly, spousal support is generally awarded to mothers caring for minor 
dependent children. Overall, they found that women continue to be economically 
disadvantaged following divorce.35Their research shows that for instance, The Times’ reporting 
on the ‘propensity of the family courts to make spousal maintenance awards for life’36 is wrong. 
Instead, the opposite is true – all their data indicated a ‘clean break culture’. From a data set of 
399 court files, joint lives orders were made in just 5.5 per cent of cases. Similarly, in Hilary 
Woodward’s survey of 369 court cases, only 2 per cent were joint lives orders for more than a 
nominal amount.37This indicates that whilst gold-digger, alimony drone and meal ticket for life 
tropes are made credible by media reporting, such reports do not reflect the reality for women 
on divorce. 
Believing in these stereotypes has consequences. As Sandra Fredman put it: 
 
Stereotypical images of women have throughout the ages been used to justify detrimental 
treatment. Because women are classified as different in the relevant respects, it appears 
justifiable to subject them to detrimental treatment.38 
 
                                                          
34 Drawn from interviews with practitioners in England in 2012-2013, two focus group discussions conducted in 
2016 with 14 first instance judges and a court file survey of c.400 cases collected in 2012 from cases concluded 
between 2010-2012. 
35 Miles and Hitchings (n 11). This finding is consistent with empirical research sin e the 1980s, discussed later 
in this article. 
36 Michael Gouriet, ‘Meal ticket appeal: court endorses a clean break’ The Times (London, 26 April 2018) 
<https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/meal-ticket-appeal-court-endorses-a-clean-brk-nvm3gl20p> accessed 3 
June 2018.  
37 Hilary Woodward, ‘“Everyday” financial remedy orders: do they achieve fair pension provision on divorce?’ 
[2015] Child and Family Law Quarterly 151, 164. 
38 Sandra Fredman, Women and the Law (Clarendon Press 1998) 301. 
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Ingrained by long standing biases, the stereotypes of alimony drones, gold-diggers and meal 
tickets for life have a personal cost for women. They are contributing to a shift in how women’s 
economic entitlement is perceived on divorce and assist in justifying detrimental treatment of 
women. Perhaps most significantly, such tropes can affect the actual resolution of financial 
disputes on divorce. Hunter, Barlow, Smithson and Ewing have shown that disputes are often 
affected by the emotional and moral norms of the parties.39Their empirical findings drawn from 
interviews with parties with experience of dispute resolution40 indicated that for women these 
included ‘feelings of guilt, pragmatism, sacrifice or self-preservation, concerns about 
compensation or a desire for reasonableness, which were rarely put forward by men’. In 
contrast, Hunter et al. found that men expressed the norm of formal equality twice as often as 
women. This context of formal equality masks dependency and is tied to the trope of the 
independent woman, celebrates independence, and it encourages women to react in a visceral 
way to the accusation of the gold-digger, by either seeking to prove they don’t need their 
partner’s money, or by vilifying women who do. Yet as Joan Tronto argues, assuming the 
existence of autonomous actors (as most democratic political theories do) does not explain 
‘how individuals can balance autonomy and dependency in their lives’.41 Neither does it 
acknowledge the network of relationships and responsibilities that inherently impact decision 
making surrounding the negotiation of financial settlements on divorce.42 Therefore, formal 
equality and the assumption that everyone is equally autonomous ‘reiterates well-worn patterns 
                                                          
39 Rosemary Hunter, Anne Barlow, Janet Smithson and Jan Ewing, ‘Law, Discretion, Gender and Justice in Out-
of-Court Financial Settlements’ (2018) 31(2) Australian Journal of Family Law 189-203. See also Emma 
Hitchings, Joanna Miles and Hilary Woodward, Assembling the Jigsaw Puzzle on Divorce (University of 
Bristol, 2013) for findings on how non-legal factors influence the process of dispute resolution. 
40 This was part of a broader study by Hunter et al. investigating out-of-court family dispute resolution processes 
and outcomes in England and Wales in both children’s and financial matters between 1996 and 2014. 
41 Joan C. Tronto, Caring Democracy: Markets, Equality and Justice (New York University Press 2013) 31. 
42 Jonathan Herring, Relational Autonomy and Family Law (Springer 2014) 68. See also Sharon Thompson, 
Prenuptial Agreements and the Presumption of Free Choice (Hart 2015) chapter 6. 
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of discriminatory attitudes’.43 As Emma Hitchings has aptly put it, formal equality’s 
appearance of neutrality ‘highlighted through the use of terms such as fairness, equality, 
settlement and autonomy’ can mean that women are ‘particularly vulnerable during financial 
settlement negotiations’.44 
This is exacerbated by the dichotomy of ‘gold-digger’ and ‘independent woman’ often 
employed in media reports on divorce, which contributes to the voices of the broad spectrum 
of women in between being silenced and lost. This includes an individual who becomes 
economically dependent on her partner because marriage does create interdependence, 
especially when there are children. She might make decisions for the welfare of the family that 
mean sacrificing her earning power.45 And whilst she is not a gold-digger nor entirely self-
sufficient, she is likely to be affected adversely by these powerful tropes. 
As a result, this article investigates how stereotypes about wives have helped create a 
backlash against efforts to implement substantive equality and recognise care. This is 
significant because it leads to false perceptions about the law, which in turn seeps into public 
consciousness and could affect how parties negotiate financial settlements and future reform. 
To this end, I will first examine press coverage of wives and financial provision on divorce 
through a study of Mills v Mills.46 
 
Part 2: Mills v Mills in the News 
My earlier work has shown how the phrase ‘gold-digger’ has been used as a weapon against 
women, which creates an image of wives as predatory and obscures the causes of economic 
                                                          
43 Tronto (n 41) 31. 
44 Hitchings (n 26) 361. 
45 See Anna Heenan, ‘Causal and temporal connections in financial remedy cases: the meaning of marriage’ 
(2018) 30(1) Child and Family Law Quarterly 75. 
46 Mills (n 16). 
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dependency in the relationship.47 To understand the wider cultural context of such images, and 
to help reveal how stereotypes enter the public domain, this section examines six national press 
reports48 concerning  the 2017 Court of Appeal financial provision case Mills v Mills.49 The 
media reporting of wives in financial provision cases is an important part of this story. These 
reports illuminate media misunderstandings of the law of financial provision on divorce, that 
are in turn likely to encourage public misunderstandings, showing how stereotypes about wives 
are linked to myths about the law. An awareness of this is important.50When decisions are made 
over financial settlements, nuptial agreements and the terms of such agreements, negotiations 
and the exercise of power between the parties is affected by the gulf between public perceptions 
of the law51 and how the law operates in practice.52 
To emphasise the impact of media reporting on our understandings of events related to 
financial relief proceedings, I deliberately do not outline the facts of Mills v Mills before 
presenting media reports on this case, so that these reports can be taken at face value. The 
sample of reports was put together by researching the ten most read news titles in the UK 
according to Ofcom.53 From these titles, four sources were selected which covered Mills more 
                                                          
47 Thompson (n 14). 
48This approach has been adopted in relation to press reporting on paid homecare workers: Hayes (n 19) 171. 
For more media reports on Mills (n 14) not included in this article, see: ‘Mrs Millstone…? (The Transparency 
Project, 12 February 2017) <http://www.transparencyproject.org.uk/Ms-millstone/> accessed 3 June 2018. 
49 Mills (n 16). 
50 Doughty, Reed and Magrath (n 24). 
51 For instance, there appears to be a common assumption that all assets are automatic lly split 50/50 on divorce 
under English law, as indicated on several family law practitioner websites (including: 
https://harrogatefamilylaw.co.uk/is-everything-always-split-5050-in-divorce/; 
http://www.portner.co.uk/news/divorce-myth-busting-the-couple-s-assets-ar -always-divided-50-50). 
52The financial outcome on divorce is rarely 50/50 and instead depends on exercise of judicial discretion under 
section 23 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 with a list of factors for the judg  to consider under section 25 of 
the Act. For more detail on this, see Thompson (n 14) 1237. 
53 Ofcom, News consumption in the UK: 2018, 25 July 2018 <https://www.ofcom.org.uk/research-and-data/tv-
radio-and-on-demand/news-media/news-consumption> accessed 1 September 2018. As reports were taken from 
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than other titles,54 and online articles published by these news titles were selected over a week-
long period following the Court of Appeal decision (6 – 12 February 2017). The sample focuses 
on Court of Appeal coverage, as reports on the Supreme Court decision repeat much of the 
initial reports. 
 
Headline 1: Divorced men doomed to life as a cash machine.55 
This article presents the facts of this case as being simply that Mr Mills divorced his wife 15 
years ago but has had to increase his payments to her because she had spent her divorce 
settlement. The phrase ‘gold-diggers’ is used in the article, and the author is highly critical of 
the law: 
 
It’s often claimed that ex-wives can see their former husbands as cash machines, compounding 
this by stripping them of the human right of fatherhood. This not only flies in the face of equality 
but can also cause men to question their desire to live. In the past seven years suicide among 
men aged 45-49 have risen by 40%. 
 
This report makes it clear that the outcome for the husband in Mills v Mills was in the author’s 
view unfair and then uses this case to make a broader statement about the current law. The 
author calls for reform of the law of financial provision on divorce, connecting its injustice to 
male suicides. The headline and article misrepresent the joint lives order at issue in Mills, by 
                                                          
online sources, the Daily Mail and Mail on Sunday were treated as being the same source because they were 
published on the same website. 
54 For instance, by 1 January 2019, Mills had been reported 14 times in The Times, 9 times in the Daily Mail, 6 
times in The Telegraph and 4 times in the Evening Standard. There were no online news reports in widely read 
news titles like The Guardian. 
55 Martin Daubney, ‘Divorced men doomed to life as a cash machine’ The Times (London, 12 February 2017) 




explaining it as being ‘an allowance she will enjoy for the rest of her life’. If Ms Mills re-
partners or if her circumstances change, the order can be reviewed. 
 
Headline 2: Court orders man to increase payments to wife who lost bulk of divorce settlement 
with poor financial decisions.56 
The facts of Mills v Mills are ostensibly outlined in this report, whereby Ms Mills ‘leaves the 
marriage with all, or almost all the liquid capital’, subsequently loses it, and successfully argues 
that her periodical payments should be increased. In this article there is detail on Mr Mills’ 
calls for reform of the law, calling for ‘changes to the law to limit spouses to five years 
maximum maintenance’. Although the phrases ‘alimony drone’ and ‘gold-digger’ are not used 
in the article, there are several references to the wife as being financially dependent on Mr 
Mills without any effort to be self-sufficient. The sense of injustice for Mr Mills is clear, with 
his QC quoted as saying: ‘It is wrong in principle and in law that the wife should continue to 
depend, and indeed seek to increase, her dependence on the husband’. 
 
Headline 3: Business man’s fury as judge orders him to support his ex-wife for life after she 
blew £230k payout on homes.57 
This article is based on an interview with Mr Mills, which therefore does not present M  Mills’ 
side of the story. Although other reports implied that Ms Mills had successfully applied to the 
court for more money, it is revealed in this report that the case was in fact brought by Mr Mills. 
                                                          
56 ‘Court orders man to increase payments to wife who lost bulk of divorce settlement with poor financial 
decisions’ The Telegraph (London, 6 February 2017) <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/06/court-
orders-man-increase-payments-wife-lost-bulk-divorce-settlement/> accessed 3 June 2018. 
57 David Churchill and Jonathan Prynn, ‘Business man’s fury as judge orders him to support his ex-wife for life 
after she blew £230k payout on homes’ Evening Standard (London, 8 February 2017) 
<https://www.standard.co.uk/news/london/businessman-s-fury-as-judge-orders-him-to-support-his-exwife-for-
life-after-she-blew-230k-payout-on-a3461391.html> accessed 3 June 2018. 
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He sought to have her periodical payments (spousal maintenance) reduced, arguing their adul  
son is now independent and saying he regretted the original deal made at the time of their 
separation. Mr Mills’ view of the Court of Appeal decision is that it is ‘grossly unfair’, and he 
calls for reform of the law: 
 
I don’t think it’s right that after divorce you should be tied together for ever. I don’t think you 
can move on mentally or physically with that tie in place. The law is wrong in that regard … I 
feel like I am paying for her mismanagement of finances … I’m angry and frustrated the system 
allows this to happen. I don’t really want this to be about me and her, I think there’s a wider 
issue about the law. I’ve no need to put her down, I’d rather the effort was concentrated on 
making the law work for people. 
 
Headline 4: I’m paying for HER mistakes: Husband who was ordered to support his ex-wife 
for life 15 years AFTER they divorced calls for a time limit on maintenance after she blew her 
£230,000 payout on bad investment.58 
This report reinforces the sentiments expressed by Mr Mills in the Evening Standard article. 
Even the language used in the headline of this article is provocative – ‘I’m paying for HER 
mistakes’ clearly elicits sympathy for the husband, anger at the wife and a sense of injustice 
about the law. We are again told that Mr Mills is ‘furious’ at the ‘grossly unfair’ decision 
reached by the court and the entire article focuses on Ms Mills ‘failures’ and ‘poor financial 
decisions’. 
                                                          
58 Alex Matthews and Steph Cockroft, ‘I'm paying for HER mistakes': Husband who was ordered to support his 
ex-wife for life 15 years AFTER they divorced calls for a time limit on maintenance after she blew her £230,000 
payout on bad investment’ Daily Mail (London, 8 February 2017) <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
4204214/Court-order-makes-man-pay-ex-wife-s-mistakes.html> accessed 3 June 2018. 
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At this point, taking these reports at face value would lead one to believe that the law 
does not encourage men and women to be financially independent after divorce. The law is 
presented as making lifetime awards that unfairly prejudice men and enable women to be 
alimony drones.  And if the Court of Appeal in Mills v Mills is increasing maintenance as a 
result of the wife’s own poor judgement after relationship breakdown, it could be argued that 
the law is encouraging gold diggers, and that there does need to be reform as Mr Mills claims.
These assumptions are understandable, but further investigation into this case reveals that these 
press reports have missed key details about the case. 
 
Headline 5: Trolls target woman after divorce payout.59 
This report is one of the few examples where the reader gleans Ms Mills’ perspective on the 
case. She clarifies a few facts that were not made clear in other reports: 
 
It should be noted that since the divorce 15 years ago, I have never returned to the court to 
increase my maintenance, despite my financial difficulty and bad health and low earnings … 
This was Mr Mills’s application to the court to reduce or eliminate the maintenance despite the 
fact our son is still in full-time education and still living with me at home. 
 
Ms Mills also comments on the other press reports on her financial provision case and their 
effect: 
 
                                                          
59 Frances Gibb and Jonathan Ames, ‘Trolls target woman after divorce payout’ The Times (London, 10 
February 2017) <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/edition/news/trolls-target-woman-after-divorce-payout-
ddvqv7qrn> accessed 3 June 2018. 
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There have been a number of articles published recently in respect of this appeal which give a 
very one-sided version of the facts in this case … [t]he tone and content of the reporting has 
caused me considerable distress, with internet hate mail. 
 
Headline 6: ‘I’m NOT a gold digger’: The ex-wife vilified as a cold, cunning chancer after 
winning a huge rise in maintenance payments 15 YEARS after her divorce blasts back and says 
it’s all her ex’s fault.60 
This headline is representative of many of those studied, in that it adds to the news rhetoric of 
stereotypes about wives. As Faith Gordon notes, paying attention to headlines like this is 
important because it summarises the most ‘poignant’ pieces of information in a way that 
attracts the reader’s attention, and encourages the reader to process the text in a particular 
way.61 This headline is a notable example of this. Though Ms Mills’ perspective is reported 
here, the wording of the headline continues to reinforce the derogatory image created 
throughout other media reports: Ms Mills as ‘a cold, cunning chancer’ who ‘blasts back’ at her 
ex-husband. This does not invite the reader to be sympathetic about Ms Mills. 
In the main text of the report, Ms Mills reveals that the coverage of her case in the press 
has caused her to be labelled as a gold-digger: 
 
I feel like I have been through a character assassination, both at the hands of my ex-husband 
and the public. They’ve said I’m a gold digger. It’s not true. I’m nothing of the sort. The past 
                                                          
60 Olga Craig, ‘‘I’m NOT a gold digger’: The ex-wife vilified as a cold, cunning chancer after winning a huge 
rise in maintenance payments 15 YEARS after her divorce blasts back and says it’s all her ex’s fault’ Mail on 
Sunday  (London, 11 February 2017) <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-4215578/Maria-hits-winning-
increase-maintenance.html>accessed 3 June 2018. 
61 Faith Gordon, Children, Young People and the Press in a Transitioning Society: Representations, Reactions 
and Criminalisation (Palgrave 2018) chapter 4. 
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two years of fighting my ex-husband have been incredibly stressful and have taken their toll on 
me physically and emotionally. 
 
Although The Telegraph reported62 that Ms Mills had received all the liquid capital on 
separation, in this article the reader learns that she did not perceive the original settlement as 
fair and she ostensibly did not leave the marriage on an equal footing with her husband: 
 
At the time of our divorce my husband claimed he couldn’t afford to buy a house for himself 
and was renting a room. He suggested I should use £200,000 to buy a small, terraced home for 
me and my son. Yet immediately after everything was settled he bought a £350,000 house for 
himself, his girlfriend and her daughter – and paid for that daughter’s upbringing from the age 
of eight until she was 23. 
 
Taken together with the previous report in The Times,63 the reader learns that although 
the Mills’ son is an adult, he is not independent in the way Mr Mills stated in the Evening 
Standard.64 Furthermore, although Ms Mills fell into financial difficulty as the press reported, 
she was not the party who applied to court. It was Mr Mills who brought the case to court 
because he wanted to terminate (or reduce) the amount of money he was paying Ms Mills, 
which was £1,100 a month. In answer, Ms Mills asked the court to consider increasing her 
periodical payments as she was unable to meet her basic needs and ended up winning the 
appeal, having had to borrow money from friends and family to be able to respond to Mr Mills’ 
application to court. Therefore, Ms Mills does not appear to fit within the dictionary definition 
                                                          
62 (n 56). 
63 Gibb and Ames (n 59). 
64 Churchill and Prynn (n 57). 
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of ‘gold-digger’. Yet this is what she has been vilified through press coverage like Headlines 
1-4, where each report’s exposition of limited facts provides a skewed picture of events.65 
 
A Millstone Around the Neck? 
Uniting virtually all of the press reports on Mills is the argument that this case highlighted a 
legal injustice, in that ‘gold-digging’ or ‘alimony droning’ ex-wives are routinely awarded meal 
tickets for life. The solitary case of Mills v Mills is cited as authority for this, even though the 
work of Miles and Hitchings has shown this assertion to unrepresentative.66 Consequently, 
accusations in the press like those surrounding the Mills case suggest there must be ‘no smoke 
without fire’,67 and that the prevalence of ‘meal ticket’ orders on divorce is of real concern. 
And so with striking parallels to the ‘Justice in Divorce’ campaign of the 1980s, The Times 
subsequently launched its own ‘Family Matters’ campaign in late 2017 calling for ‘urgent’ and 
‘sweeping’ reform which would include an ‘end to the so-called meal ticket for life 
maintenance awards’.68 ‘The victim of the law’ under the ‘Justice in Divorce’ campaign, 
Douglas notes, was ‘the wronged husband, left with the millstone of the ex-wife around his 
                                                          
65 There are other reports in tabloids such as The Sun (Laura Burnip, 'IT'S GROSSLY UNFAIR' Ex-husband 
forced by judge to ‘support ex-wife for life’ after she blew £230,000 divorce payout slams ‘unfair’ system’ The 
Sun (London 8 February 2017) <https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/2816831/ex-husband-forced-to-support-wife-
for-live-slams-system/> accessed 1 January 2019) and the Mirror (Ann Stenhouse, ‘Divorcee who blew settlement 
money wins higher maintenance from ex - and he must support her for LIFE’ Mirror 
<https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/divorcee-who-blew-settlement-money-9769361> accessed 1 January 
2019) which fit the sample frame and repeat many of the aspersions cast on Mrs Mills, but do not add anything 
new to the analysis in this section, other than to further illustrate how stereotypes about wives are communicated 
to readers in mainstream news outlets. 
66 Miles and Hitchings (n 11). 
67Frances (n 3). 
68 Gibb (n 21). 
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neck’.69 The same picture is painted by media reports now, even though the facts in the cases 
being reported continue to tell a different story. 
On closer analysis of the Mills v Mills Court of Appeal judgment,70 a more balanced 
picture can be gleaned than the one portrayed in press reports. Ms Mills was awarded an 
increase in periodical payments to meet her needs71 an increase which was subsequently 
overturned by the Supreme Court in 2018.72 The Court of Appeal found that, although Ms Mills 
had made unwise investments,73 there had not been financial mismanagement74 and the court 
was clear that Ms Mills had not been ‘profligate or wanton’.75 There was nothing to suggest 
that Ms Mills was a gold-digger or alimony drone, nor did her unwise investments indicate 
mercenary intentions. Yet in all six press reports assessed above Ms Mills is either castigated 
for being a gold-digger, or (in the reports where she gives her own account) she is defending 
herself from the gold-digger accusation. This is because when the parties first separated, a joint 
lives order was made (interpreted in the press as a meal ticket for life). This joint lives order 
was not affected by the Supreme Court’s decision in this case; the Court simply restored the 
level of maintenance to the level it had been before the Court of Appeal decision.76 The 
vilification of Ms Mills for receiving this award does not provide space for discussion of the 
potential utility of a joint lives order in some cases. It may well be an appropriate response to 
                                                          
69 Douglas (n 5) 124. 
70 For a more detailed account of this case, see Heenan (n 45). 
71 In 2002, the parties’ financial claims were settled on divorce by a consent order, providing Ms Mills with a 
capital sum and periodical payments of £1,100 pcm for joint lives. The case currently before the court was 
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Mills. 
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enduring economic disadvantage following relationship breakdown, especially given Miles and 
Hitchings’ findings that 
 
a clean break does not necessarily indicate that the economically weaker party can be fully self-
supporting. She may only be able to avoid reliance on the ex-husband by relying instead on 
others, or she may have no obvious adequate alternative means of support at all.77 
 
 However, the press’ panic about meal tickets for life suggests that joint lives orders are 
never justified. On the rare occasion that a joint lives order is made (or in the Mills case, is not 
discharged), the recipient (if a woman) will be labelled a gold-digger or alimony drone 
regardless of her intentions, or whether the recipient fits the dictionary definition of these terms. 
This is not to say there are not women who fit the dictionary definition of gold-diggers 
and alimony drones, but equally, there might be men entering marriage with mercenary 
intentions too. However, these stereotypes, by their very definition, make us question women, 
not men. Irrespective of this, English law does not encourage gold-digging, but it does have 
the capacity to recognise care. Both spouses, especially after long marriages, should be able to 
leave the marriage independently and on an equal footing economically.78 The court will not 
order a clean break if this will leave one party much worse off that the other.79 Y t the ‘clear 
‘steer’ in favour of the clean break’ noted by Douglas80 indicates that in recent caselaw,81 there 
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is a firmly embedded expectation that wives will become self-sufficient following relationship 
breakdown. 
The real gold-diggers, therefore, will be outwitted if they believe the myth that under 
English law the spouse will always get half of all assets on divorce or a ‘meal ticket for life’. 
If the court hears that the marriage has been short, and that little contribution has been made to 
the marriage, the non-moneyed spouse will not be entitled to a large award.82 T king all of this 
into account, the media backlash indicated by press coverage of cases such as Mills v Mills has 
helped perpetuate a moral panic about gold-diggers and alimony drones and has propagated 
myths about the law of financial provision on divorce.83 This is considered further in the 
following section, where the consequences of myths about financial provision on divorce are 
inspected more closely. 
 
Part 3: Myths about Financial Provision on Divorce 
The assertion in press reports on Mills v Mills – that the law encourages gold-diggers and 
alimony drones – has encouraged a moral panic that financial provision in divorce is in urgent 
need of reform so that husbands can protect their property. Without any robust academic proof 
                                                          
82 This was reinforced in Sharp v Sharp [2017] EWCA Civ 408. 
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law-maintenance-update> accessed 1 January 2019. Though Heather Mills has been cast as the archetypal gold-
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surrounding this case being challenged in the liberal press, though these reports are much less prevalent (see 
Kira Cochrane, ‘Why we love to hate Heather’ The Guardian (London 20 March 2008) 




that there is an issue with gold-digging or alimony droning wives, women are routinely 
castigated as such. Even worse, these charges obscure the research showing women in fact do 
worse than men on relationship breakdown across all levels of wealth.84 stereotypes about 
wives cause a backlash against the equality so far achieved under law.  
In the landmark case White v White, Lord Nicholls said that when it comes to dividing 
assets on divorce, non-financial contributions to the welfare of the family such as reproductive 
labour, domestic labour and care for dependants must be valued as much as economic 
contributions.85 Recognising the value of unpaid work in the home is important, Lord Nicholls 
said, because the division of labour in the marriage is gendered, and when someone’s financial 
contributions are deemed more important by the law, the person responsible for contributing 
to the non-financial parts of family life is left at a disadvantage.86 
Unfortunately, in spite of such judicial attempts to say that care matters and should be 
valued economically, non-financial contributions are consistently devalued in society.87 R cent 
calls for divorce reform would undermine judicial efforts to raise consciousness about the more 
gendered aspects of both financial provision on divorce and prenuptial agreements.88 
Importantly, these calls for reform are not only from Mr Mills and other disgruntled husbands 
who are given prominent voices in press reports. As this section will show, those in positions 
of authority are also advocating reform based on the flawed assertion that the law of financial 
provision on divorce encourages gold-diggers and alimony drones, further embedding 
stereotypes about women and the myths these stereotypes promulgate.  
                                                          
84 Hayley Fisher and Hamish Low, ‘Recovery from Divorce: Comparing High and Low-Income Couples’ 
(2016) 30 International J. of Law, Policy and the Family 338. 
85White (n 12). 
86 ibid [24]. 
87 See Heenan (n 45). 
88 See Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42, at [175]-[176] (Lady Hale). 
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If gold-digging is pathologized as a female trait,89 he ramifications for reform of 
financial provision can be concerning. This becomes clear when one places themselves in the 
position of someone who has only read press reports on Mr Mills framing the outcome of his 
case as unjust. This individual then goes on to read the views of Baroness Deech, who is one 
of the authorities on family law in the House of Lords and is one of the ‘legal grandees’90 
supporting The Times’ call for an end to ‘meal ticket for life’ awards.91 In press reports 
Baroness Deech directly refers to Mills v Mills. She believes the outcome was wrong in this 
case and the law needs to be reformed: 
  
Our judges are being very old fashioned I’m afraid. They are over-chivalrous and the way they 
were in the 19th century. People wonder why, 15 years after a marriage has ended, one person 
has to keep paying money to another.92 
 
Here, Baroness Deech is confirming suspicions about the judiciary after reading one-sided 
accounts of Mr Mills’ plight. Her words are persuasive in a society that vilifies gold-diggers 
and celebrates (at least in this context) ‘independent women’: 
 
                                                          
89 Press reports about gold-diggers and alimony drones are undoubtedly influential but the power of these 
stereotypes is strengthened much more when those in positions of auth rity claim there is proof women do want 
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90 Gibb (n 21). 
91 Her views are supported by Baroness Fiona Shackleton, another lifelong peer and family law expert (see HL 
Deb 11 May 2018, vol 791).  
92 Patrick Sawyer, ‘Divorces are skewed by judges' outdated chivalry, says female peer pushing for cap on 
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If there is one thing that stops women getting back on their feet and being treated seriously and 
equally at work, it is the assumption throughout the legal system that once a woman is arried 
she is somehow disabled and incapable ever of managing on her own for the rest of her life. It 
is a very serious impediment to equality.93 
 
On this view, the law of financial provision on divorce is obstructing gender equality by 
sending a message that women are not as capable of independence as men are. Here, Baroness 
Deech’s perspective is different from the press reports concerned with injustice to married men, 
but it is no less powerful. Baroness Deech’s assertion is that the law is equally unjust to men 
and women because the law infantilises women, making it difficult for them to shake the 
‘housewife’ image and to be taken seriously as ‘independent women’. 
Baroness Deech’s argument that the current law is anti-equality is ostensibly 
persuasive. She says that the disadvantages experienced by married women in the public sphere 
are not attributable to their husbands and that our law legitimises the attitudes of employers 
who discriminate against women, because, she says they are aware that the law rewards gold-
diggers and alimony drones.  And so Baroness Deech has proposed reform which, she says, 
could help women to be more equal and independent in society.94 
The Divorce (Financial Provision) Bill 2017-2019 aims to reform the law of financial 
provision on divorce by doing three things.95 First, it provides for an equal division of assets 
acquired during the marriage (but excluding assets acquired before the marriage, and property 
acquired through gift or inheritance). Secondly, the Bill seeks to curb periodical payments to 
no longer than 5 years (unless this would lead to ‘serious financial hardship’). Finally, the Bill 
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would make prenuptial and postnuptial agreements binding.96 The Bill includes standard 
procedural safeguards such as requirements of independent advice, cool-off periods and 
disclosure but importantly, the Bill does not include any scope to set these agreements aside if 
their effect would be to leave one person in a position of need (which the court currently has 
discretion to do).97 
The combined effect of these clauses is to reduce the discretion afforded to the judiciary 
to ensure substantive equality.98 As Baroness Deech’s views are based on a liberal and formal 
version of equality, her Bill elides structural inequalities that discriminate against those made 
economically dependent through care. By citing independence, individual responsibility and 
choice as desirable conditions over and above those connected to the ethic of care, proposals 
are directed to the upper and middle classes and would detrimentally affect the non-moneyed 
spouse. Talk of gold-diggers, alimony drones and independent women therefore takes place in 
a context of what Tronto calls ‘privileged irresponsibility’.99Men and women who are in 
conditions of privileged irresponsibility can take on public duties and leave behind private 
duties.100 Even after separation, they can afford to pay someone else to clean their house and 
help care for their children. And so those who are not in such conditions of privileged 
irresponsibility seek to lose the most from the prevalence of stereotypes about wives and the 
myths about divorce such stereotypes promulgate, which fuel support for reform like that 
proposed by Baroness Deech. 
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Part 4: Countering Myths in the Courtroom and Beyond 
So far, this article has argued that in order to understand how stereotypes like ‘gold-digger’ 
and ‘alimony drone’ impact on women, it is necessary to consider the discourses within which 
these stereotypes are situated. But it is also necessary to confront the potentially damaging 
effect of these stereotypes and the question of what can be done to counter them in practice.  
Baroness Deech frequently refers to the gold digger when advocating for the passage 
of her Private Member’s Bill . Indeed, when she first introduced the Bill in 2014 she said it was 
necessary to fortify the system of financial provision on divorce against exploitation by the 
‘gold-digger’ who has ‘deprived irrationally [a man] of everything he had worked for’.101 
 This quotation is powerful because it corroborates the stereotypes about wives in press 
reports and further entrenches myths about divorce, because these words are spoken in 
Parliament by a peer with expertise in family law. By stepping into the debate with concrete 
reform proposals, Baroness Deech has fuelled suspicions that the law is undeservedly generous 
to wives and has ostensibly provided a solution to this problem with her Bill. However, research 
has consistently contradicted Baroness Deech’s view, proving that instead of focusing on the 
mythical prevalence of meal tickets for life, a real matter of concern should be women’s 
economically precarious position on divorce.102 Economic dependency within the family is 
based on gendered social values, and is not simply encouraged by the system of financial 
provision in England and Wales, just as career sacrifices made by women are not, as Baroness 
Deech has said, simply a ‘matter of choice’.103 Indeed, Baroness Deech’s argument that such 
sacrifices are simply down to the choice of the individual is another hallmark of the ‘privileged 
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irresponsibility’ within her brand of formal equality. The freedom of one’s choices depend on 
the conditions they are in.104 Choice does not mean the same thing as equality, according to 
Tronto because equal opportunity ‘is a myth if there is no equality of care for children’.105 As 
a result, while research shows there are more female breadwinners than ever before, this should 
not lead to assumptions as to the modern division of labour in the home, especially when the 
marriage has produced children.106 As Cynthia Lee Starnes has put it: 
 
According to myth, in today’s egalitarian, gender-neutral culture mothers and fathers co-parent, 
both working full-time in the paid economy and sharing equally in their leisur  time the few 
family tasks that are really necessary … [yet] Even when a married mother works outside her 
home she likely serves as the primary caretaker, undertaking a disproportionately large share 
of household chores.107 
 
Taking all of this into account, the assertions in Parliament108 that the law encourages gold-
diggers and alimony drones is damaging. In the short term, it could lead to reform that would 
be disastrous for those primarily responsible for care in the marriage. In the longer term, as 
these assertions have gone unchallenged in the House of Lords since 2014, and are still 
consistently reported in the press, their legitimacy has increased. It is therefore important that 
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the negative consequences of these stereotypes are properly factored into questions surrounding 
legislative reform of financial provision on divorce. At the very least, it is important that the 
myths about divorce created by these stereotypes are challenged directly in future 
parliamentary debates. 
Unfortunately, stereotypes about wives and corresponding myths about divorce are not 
only a problem for debates around legislative reform. The impact on public perception of the 
law is also important since many people now determine the financial consequences of divorce 
for themselves, either by signing a nuptial agreement or by reaching a settlement on divorce.  
 As I have argued previously, this was evident in my own empirical research.109 When 
researching prenuptial agreements, I interviewed attorneys in New York and found that often 
the non-moneyed spouse signs a prenup to prove she is not marrying for money, or the moneyed 
spouse insists on a prenup to be reassured he is not marrying a gold-digger. Women are more 
inclined so sign agreements out of fear of confirming the alimony droning, gold-digging 
stereotypes. To use one example from my interviews, the attorney explained that he had a client 
that used these stereotypes to his advantage: 
 
She did not want the prenup. [My client] insisted and at the last minute he capitulated and said 
it was alright. It was almost like it was a test. And because she said she would do it, [he knew] 
‘ok you’re not marrying me for my money.110 
 
Why, as in this example, would a woman sign an agreement that she did not want to sign? One 
reason is that by not signing, women are faced with the threat of confirming stereotypes about 
wives. Focusing only on the motivations of the non-moneyed spouse not only leads to a false 
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impression of the prevalence of gold-diggers and alimony drones, but also has a detrimental 
impact on financial outcomes on divorce. Parties may not ask for more money out of a fear of 
confirming such stereotypes. And so moral panics about gold-diggers and alimony drones add 
an extra layer of coercion to financial settlements and nuptial agreements. The recent English 
High Court case KA v MA111 provides an example of the effect such stereotypes can have. In 
this case, the wife was ‘psychologically torn’ between proceeding with the wedding and 
signing an agreement ‘which might well, at some point in the future, operate to her significant 
financial detriment’.112 Roberts J considered the wife’s reasons for entering the prenup, finding 
that the wife ‘took this course for what may have been the best of reasons … motivated 
principally by what she perceived to be in their son’s best interests’.113 She even suspected that 
the wife did not make much attempt to ask for more under the agreement114 out of fear that the 
wedding would not go ahead.115 ‘I am not like that’,116 the wife said. Taking the circumstances 
of this case into account, it was clear what she meant by ‘that’. By refusing to ask for more 
money under the terms of the prenup, she would show she was not a gold-digger or a future 
alimony drone. She would not be labelled the ‘cold, cunning chancer’,117 as Ms Mills had been 
in the Mail on Sunday. And her wedding could go ahead. 
 These examples indicate that tropes like ‘alimony drone’, ‘gold-digger’ and ‘meal ticket 
for life’ are influencing individuals’ decision making. When media narratives place emphasis 
on these tropes, the intentions of the non-moneyed, (not the moneyed) party are interrogated in 
a way that does not place the non-moneyed parties’ financial demands, needs and choices on a 
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par with those of the moneyed spouse. In practice this can lead to spouses agreeing to financial 
settlements that will ultimately affect them detrimentally. Furthermore, focusing on whether 
someone is a gold-digger, or on requiring her to prove to the world that she will never be 
economically dependent (and signing entitlement away accordingly), facilitates a shift in 
emphasis away from valuing care and other non-financial contributions. The impact of 
devaluing care on relationship breakdown is that structural inequalities are reinforced and those 
who do make the non-financial contributions to the welfare of the family are disadvantaged. 
Research shows how gendered this work still is. In November 2016, the Office for 
National Statistics reported that women across all wealth brackets take longer to recover after 
divorce than men.118 The work of Fisher and Low also indicates that women take longer to 
recover economically on relationship breakdown at all levels of wealth.119And so limiting 
financial provision to caregiving spouses is neither a safe nor productive strategy for addressing 
structural inequalities between men and women. But the ‘meal ticket’, gold-digger mentality 
does not appreciate this reality. 
However, confronting the question of what can be done to counter these tropes is 
difficult. Explaining the law on financial provision to those who are certain it makes women 
treat men like cash machines120 feels impossible in the current climate. Not only is the law in 
this area complex; the press reports assessed above indicate that the voices of experts are being 
drowned out by more forceful voices shouting about injustice when they see women receive 
substantial awards on divorce. There is a perception that capital earned by the moneyed spous  
is his alone, rather than capital generated directly and indirectly by both spouses working 
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outside and inside the home. This is connected to the view that women who are awarded a 
share in this capital on divorce must be gold-diggers or alimony drones.  
 In spite of these difficulties, it is important that something is done. The influence 
stereotypes about wives have must be acknowledged and condemned in the courtroom. In 
Waggott v Waggott,121 the wife’s counsel raised this very issue, and according to Moylan LJ, 
he was:  
 
evidently concerned that recent public debate about how the courts determine a 
spouse’s claim for maintenance might somehow intrude into the determination of this 
case. His particular focus was what he described as the unfair use of the expression 
"meal ticket for life" which, he suggested, was often deployed without regard to a 
spouse's fair entitlement which might properly include long-term maintenance.122 
 
Ms Waggot’s counsel was concerned that his client would be portrayed as an alimony drone 
or gold-digger for seeking an award that would place her on equal financial footing with her 
husband on divorce.123 In response, Moylan LJ noted that he understood the expression meal 
ticket for life ‘can be used as an unfair trope’ but refused to comment further. While it is 
commended that Moylan LJ recognised the unfairness of this stereotype, his judgment in 
Waggott could have engaged further with the influence of stereotypes in financial provision 
cases. Similarly, in his leading judgment in the Supreme Court in Mills, Lord Wilson said it 
                                                          
121 Waggott v Waggott [2018] EWCA Civ 727. 
122ibid [156]. 
123 She had left employment in 2001 and (apart from a short period in 2002/20 3) had not worked in paid 
employment since, while the husband’s career went from strength to strength: ibid [17]. 
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was ‘misleading’ and ‘unattractive’ for joint lives orders to be described as being meal tickets 
for life but did not assess the impact of this phrase further.124 
Reflexive engagement with stereotypes should be an important part of judicial 
reasoning. There is a gap between what the law is, and what social perceptions of the law are, 
and accurate information on the law125 and evidence of the detrimental impact of tropes like 
alimony drone, gold-digger and meal ticket for life is important. Much has been written about 
the conditions that lead to power inequalities in intimate financial agreements and conditions 
that lead to inequality of bargaining power are crucial to understanding how people make 
decisions in relationships.126 But individuals’ social perceptions are important too. Judgment 
making has the potential to be an important influence in practice.  
Judicial opinion will not counteract media stereotypes by ignoring them, and so there 
must be direct engagement with the negative consequences of such stereotypes on women. 
Failing to do so arguably obstructs justice, which as Tronto notes, ‘requires honest exploration 
of the social, economic and political institutions that constrain people’s lives’.127 The influence 
of the moral panic surrounding stereotypes about wives is part of this context, as it directs 
attention towards the perception that overly generous awards are made and away from the 
detrimental impact of divorce on women.128 This not only mis-frames important concerns, it 
also potentially reinforces the prevalence of clean break orders in practice, which in turn affects 
the economic recovery of women after divorce. Unfounded stereotypes should not be relied 
upon at the expense of those in need of provision. By reflexively engaging with misplaced 
                                                          
124 Mills (n 17), [25]. 
125 See for example the work of The Transparency Project a <http://www.transparencyproject.org.uk/>.  
126 Alison Diduck, ‘Autonomy and Family Justice’ (2016) 28 Child and Family Law Quarterly 133; Anne 
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concerns in the courtroom, there is greater scope for members of the judiciary to interrogate 
parties’ capacity for economic self-sufficiency instead of assuming that this will be possible 
following separation.  
One way of doing this could be to bring ‘social reality to the courtroom’129 by taking 
‘judicial notice’ of the gendered impact stereotypes about wives can have. This would mean 
that the impact of derogatory, women-centred terms like ‘gold-digger’ and ‘alimony drone’ 
would be explicitly acknowledged, so that a factual inquiry into parties’ actual (not assumed)130 
capacities to become self-sufficient can be scrutinised. Therefore, when considering whether 
to make a clean break order, the court would invariably pay attention to evidence-based 
research of women’s experiences and of empirical research on the financial impact of divorce 
and its impoverishing effect on women and children, instead of moral panics that have been 
shown to be ill-founded.131 The doctrine of judicial notice, whereby a judge ‘assume[s] a 
position of authority to find a ‘social fact’ that requires no reference,’132 is controversial 
(particularly in US jurisprudence)133in that it is an exercise of power because it depends upon 
his or her extra-legal, ‘social’ knowledge.134Acknowledging these difficulties however, Claire 
Heureux-Dubé argues that the family law context is particularly well-suited to the use of 
                                                          
129 Claire L. Heureux-Dubé, ‘Re-examining the doctrine of judicial notice in the family law context’ (1994) 26 
Ottowa Law Review 551, 551. 
130 Miles and Hitchings’ study found that a clean break is frequently ordered without clear absence of the 
parties’ abilities to become self-sufficient: (n 11). 
131 This is an area where there is a clear contrast in family law between moneyand children cases due to the case 
management process. In children cases, CAFCASS will bring in some relevant empirical evidence on child 
development to an individual case. Bryan Rodgers, Liz Trinder and Teresa Williams, Towards a family justice 
observatory to improve the generation and application of research (Nuffield Foundation 2015). 
132 Heather Douglas, Francesca Bartlett, Trish Luker and Rosemary Hunter, ‘Reflections on Rewriting the Law’ 
in Heather Douglas, Francesca Bartlett, Trish Luker and Rosemary Hunter (eds) Australian Feminist Judgments: 
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judicial notice, as it enables the judiciary to assess ‘the true consequences from the relationship 
and its breakup…formulating a more accurate picture of the realistic needs of the parties, 
particularly when self-sufficiency…[is] at issue’.135 Using judicial notice in this way allows 
the judge to challenge stereotypes and to better understand the context in which financial 
matters are negotiated between parties on divorce.A possible counter argument to this is that 
explicitly referencing stereotypes in judgment writing could lead to accusations of bias in 
favour of wives. Claims of neutrality and objectivity in judicial reasoning are often criticised 
in feminist scholarship,136 for members of the judiciary are inevitably influenced by their own 
experiences and opinions. Yet failing to directly acknowledge such stereotypes is arguably 
neither neutral nor objective either, when there is evidence they are detrimentally affecting 
women on divorce.  
Appropriating the tools of feminist judgment writing could assist in this regard.137 One 
notable aspect of feminist judgment writing is the central influence of care, emphasising the 
importance of relationships and interconnectedness instead of autonomy and independence.138 
This shift in emphasis is important given the neo-liberal m ntra that ‘autonomy is good for 
you’, which has repeatedly been used to legitimise the relegation of family disputes to the 
private sphere. The zenith of this change has been the virtual obliteration of legal aid in family 
law cases since 2012, a reform which Jess Mant argues is rooted in neo-liberal ideology in that 
individuals are supposed to have responsibility for their own circumstances, whatever the 
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structural barriers they experience.139 The narrative of self-sufficiency in tandem with the 
backlash against dependency created by media stereotypes and Baroness Deech’s proposed 
reform has created a hostile environment for the recognition and valuation of care. But by 
employing the tools of feminist judgment writing, the courtroom can become a ‘site of 
resistance to persistent gendered norms’140 and stereotypes affecting the negotiation of 
financial settlements and nuptial agreements. Furthermore, as Judith Masson141 and Duncan 
Kennedy142 have argued, judgment making is deliberative and strategic. Judges can shape ‘not 
just an individual decision but the law itself through the focus and construction of their 
judgments, even when another outcome of the case appears certain’, and the content of 
judgments may be used for deliberate effect.143 
 
Conclusion 
Baroness Deech has consistently emphasised the need for reform of financial provision on 
divorce because of the perception that current law infantilises women. 'Younger 
academics...are reinventing the wheel', she says, by portraying women as 
victims.144Respectfully, I disagree. Concern for those with caring commitments in marriage is 
not based on antiquated ideas as suggested by Baroness Deech; it is a live issue. In the last 
decade, neo-liberal policies have systematically devalued care and privileged those who do not 
care.145 While the traditional dichotomy of housewife and breadwinner may no longer be as 
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representative, normative expectations of care have instead resulted in women performing dual 
roles of both paid (often part-time) work and unpaid caregiving.146Recognising this and 
listening to the voices of the women (and men) who want their non-financial contributions to 
be valued is not to treat caregivers as victims; it is to recognise that a focus on maximising and 
protecting personal wealth ignores the realities of economic dependency in family life. 
However, this is not the story told in press reports. Instead, as this article has shown, wives are 
portrayed as alimony drones and gold-diggers, who are parasitic on wealthy men. The phrase 
‘meal ticket for life’ is employed repeatedly in these reports too, even though research has 
proven quantitatively and empirically that lifetime maintenance is not only rare,147 but that 
women across all levels of wealth are economically worse off on divorce than men.148The 
research also suggests that proliferation of such stereotypes has created barriers for women 
when negotiating financial settlements and nuptial agreements, widening the gender gap on 
divorce even more. 
Stereotypes about wives contribute to misunderstandings as to how the ‘everyday’ 
divorce149 affects the spouse who has undertaken most of the non-financial work in the 
relationship, who is still usually the wife. And when the language of ‘gold-digger’, ‘alimony 
drone’ or ‘meal-ticket for life’ enters the debate, women must work much harder to justify 
getting what they are legitimately entitled to on divorce. Moreover, these stereotypes contribute 
to the drowning out of other concerns, such as Lord Nicholls’ compelling call for equality after 
divorce in 2000: ‘whatever the division of labour chosen by the husband and wife, or forced 
upon them by circumstances, fairness requires that this should not prejudice or advantage either 
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party’.150 Unfortunately, this judicial support for equality has not addressed the ongoing 
unequal economic impact of divorce on men and women.151 
When inequality is bound up in complex political, social, economic and historical 
structures, there is no clear solution to closing the gap between men and women on divorce. 
However, negative stereotypes about wives are exacerbating these inequalities, creating false 
problems and simplistic solutions. As this article has argued, the court has a role to play in 
tackling the barriers created by such stereotypes. The case study of Mills v Mills is a clear 
demonstration of how myths about gold-diggers and alimony drones are propagated. Perhaps 
most worryingly, these press reports contribute to the misinformed perception that the law 
encourages and indulges the behaviour of money grabbing wives. More broadly, judicial 
reasoning in financial provision cases should no longer ignore the impact that stereotypes about 
wives can have. Simply acknowledging these stereotypes is not enough; as this article has 
argued, judicial reasoning should go further and reflexively engage with the practical impact 
such stereotypes can have.152 For when these stereotypes are not addressed in the courtroom or 
challenged in Parliament, their harm is indirectly legitimised. 
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151 In fact, as Miles and Hitchings’ interview findings show, it is the norm of the clean break, not the meal ticket 
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